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NATIONAL DOGMATISM OR
THE LOGIC OF CONSOCIATION?
Text is published in periodical "Survey" 1-2, 2006

Summary

The text examines the contemporary social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a basis for understanding the social and historic prerequisites of the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. The basic tenet is that the status functions of the social ontology in Bosnia and Herzegovina lack a rationally acceptable structure because they produce contradictory institutional objects, facts, processes and states of affairs, while the status functions of political ontology fail to produce deontic values / rights because they create separate intentional contents and a contradictory attitude to them. These contradictions are connected to a hyper-national attitude and lead to nationalism. The tenet is argued through the confrontation of the contents of three dogmas of nationalism and three conditions for a normal consociation of the nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The text suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a paradigm for a rigid-ideological, militaristic or religious state community in EU member states, rather a paradigm for consociation of nations and a state of free citizens who, through their social and political ontology, need to collectively accept common deontic capabilities / rights, which the European Union also accepts through its status functions.

Keywords: social ontology, political ontology, nationalism, consociation, radical interpretation of identity

Introduction

The research of social and historical preconditions which represent the basis of a process such as the transition from one political system to another, from one social ontology to another, provides an opportunity for social and political objects / phenomena, facts, processes and states of affairs to be classified differently and rearranged so as to free the field for possibility, which is narrowed between political contradictions and political tautology, between absolutely true and absolutely untrue explanations of ontology of the social world of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A logical path needs to be discovered to symbols and status functions for which those symbols are used and at the same time ensure that the identified objects, facts, processes and states of affairs are the bearers of meaning.

Phenomena / objects of social ontology such as "Bosnia and Herzegovina", "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and "Republika Srpska" currently exist side by side in Bosnia and Herzegovina; we have *facts* within that ontology such as "to be a citizen of a country which has neither a president nor a government", "to be a refugee in your hometown", or "to have a National Museum which no people wishes to finance", "to have a peace agreement, yet be unable to return to your home", "to be a member of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina an be in a unit with those who do not wish to see Bosnia and Herzegovina exist"; we have certain *processes* of social ontology such as "to change a constitution which does not exists" or "to participate in elections in a neighbouring country"; we have certain *states of affairs* such as "to be a 100% member of a national political party whose representatives in the authorities control 20% of the state territory" or "to be a person who is unable to see the borders of his/her own country" or "to be a person unable to cross the borders of other countries".

To sum up: to be a citizen in a country which is not civil, with a president and government which exist neither nominally nor in reality, to have citizenship of another country in order to be able to travel from your own country. Besides current, there are also potential political objects / objectives such as "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", then "the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been adjoined to one of the neighbouring states" , followed by "the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has split from Bosnia and Herzegovina", and only finally, as an option "the European state of Bosnia and Herzegovina", or "a member of

the European Union, the consociation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its own, rather than with the Dayton constitution, with a president and government instead of a tripartite Presidency and Council of Ministers.

In the logical or rational comprehension of phenomena, processes, states of affairs and facts a "network of beliefs" and a "network of notions" (Davidson, 2005, 95-105) exist, as well as their logical association in depth and breadth, which emerges in the expression of a certain thought, the expression of a certain belief, or simply in the purposefulness and sequencing of physical behaviour. In order to know (understand / interpret) what a theatre is, for example the "Sarajevo War Theatre" one needs to have a notion of theatre, a notion of war and a notion of city. The notion of theatre contains the notion of art, the notion of stage performance, the notion of mimesis, the notion of script, the notion of space, the notion of time, the notion of character, the notion of moral, the notion… In to order to possess / understand / interpret the notion of war we need to have the notion of conflict, the notion of warring parties, the notion of violence, the notion of defence, the notion of aggression, the notion… In order possess the notion of city…

A single syntagm comprising only three terms, such as the "Sarajevo War Theatre", reveals a profound and logically associated structure of notions which devolves down to experience, to mere things, and on the other hand reaches deep into our mental architecture, into our semantic history and linguistic competence. In order to understand objects / social ontology phenomena such as "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", "State of Bosnia and Herzegovina", or just "Bosnia and Herzegovina", we need to possess / understand the notion of citizen, the notion of society, the notion of state, the notion of republic, the notion of ownership, the notion … In order to understand the status function present in these notions, for example in the notion of state and the notion of republic, we need to possess / understand the notion of organised society, the notion of law, the notion of monopoly on the use of force, the notion of government, the notion of elections, the notion of transfer of power, the notion of parliament…

Once we exit the notional network and enter the plane of experience, i.e. when we leave the logical structure of the language of phenomena and things, then we enter the network of convictions or beliefs which lie in the basis of opinions in general. That's where we need to raise the question: why does someone believe or possess the conviction that a state which is divided into sovereign national entities has better status

functions than a civil democratic republic? Why does someone believe that it is better to have a tripartite presidency in a "triune" state community than a single president elected by all citizens of one republic? Why does someone believe that it is better to have three entity, thirty cantonal and a hundred municipal governments than a single common government? To simplify things even further we can ask: why does someone believe that speculative reasons are better than rational reasons, that the principles of national or religious or militaristic or rigid-ideological communities are better than the principles of civil life and a civil society?

Is it even possible, considering all that has been mentioned, to enter an open field where the structures, facts, states of affairs and processes of the social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina would cease to be signs of contradiction, signs of denial, signs of logical and semantic improbabilities which are persistently produced by the political ontology of a hypernational approach and brutal nationalism? In other words: is it possible to find a way for the intentional content of one identification and the logical structure of one conduct based on that intentionality to meet in an unconflicting way in one representation or in one uncontradictory status function, be it social or political?

It is my intention to bring the "historic" and "social" of the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina into connection with the mental, cultural, economic, social, philosophic, ontogenetic and psychogenetic, the elements on which assumptions are built, from which they are deduced, and which lie in the basis of an identity which establishes itself as a *network or collection of interactive reactions* (individual or collective) to an ideological description of that reality, a reaction to a physical and psychological stimulation, a reaction to communication, a reaction to the interpretation of self and "that which is different from self" within the same species. That means: to enter the background of preconditions of a process, which are realised and which act (produce a physical effect) always and only as ideological consequences of one's historical and social interpretations. By entering the mentality background one problematises a complex concept of identity, which is related to both political and social facts, as well as facts of cultural and historical ontology. [1]

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[1] The question of identify is a part of every question of logic, ontology and epistemology of society, but issues mostly related to the notion of national identity in the broadest sense, as the central notion from which different modules of interpretation.

Rational and Speculative Social Ontology

It is evident that the issue of institutions and the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the background of the mentioned contradictions. If social and political ontology produce such senseless objects / phenomena, facts, states of affairs and processes, then it is necessary to return to rational argumentation which cannot be denied by rational means (a principle which, according to T.M. Scanlon, lies in the basis of rational understanding), and that means providing a rationally acceptable and collectively sufficient answer to the question what is the content and form of institutions. What is in fact an institution and what lies beneath that notion? Is it based only on a collective acceptance (of what?) or is it necessary to define the character of that acceptance: rational or mythological, normative or speculative, based on knowledge or emotions? What are the other social and historical prerequisites of collective acceptance or rejection of some inherently contradictory approach to institutions?

John R. Searle, whose concept of describing an institution we adopt here, states the following: every society is based on collective acceptance, on ascribing functions and on status functions. Collective acceptance is the basis of every society and it consciously and intentionally creates values, relationships, states of affairs, facts, which when ascribed a status function become institutional facts. Status functions are the glue that keeps a society together. *Deontic powers* lie in the basis of the identification of values and their representation and these powers are created from status functions: rights, duties, responsibilities, permissions, authorities, requests, approvals and certificates. What allows these denontic elements to be legally distributed to society and every individual is the normative structure of institutions which defines the structure of social ontology. What is then an institution? "An institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts" (Searle, 2005, 26).

I think that it is now necessary to expand certain terms and to introduce certain new ones. Why do people ultimately identify with such values and

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follow, and in a more narrow sense related to the notion of hyper-national behaviour, nationalistic behaviour and the possibilities for a transnational attitude or behaviour will be discussed here.

relationships which are collectively acceptable? What makes certain themes or forms of certain relationships between people and the relationship of people towards nature more collectively acceptable than others from the background of collective mentality? One possible answer is that every individual wishes to be treated fairly, morally, legally based on recognized, clear and certain rules of behaviour even when that individual avoids such behaviour towards another individual. Or perhaps, and I will anticipate here, because every individual wishes to be understood in his/her actions, opinions, expressions and demeanour in the same way as he/she understands himself/herself.

I wish to underline only one thing here: collective acceptance depends on collective intentionality (focus on one common object of identification), on collective identification and on collective representation. I also wish to suggest an application of Davidson's interpretation concept (Davidson, 2001, 125-139) connected with the concept of identity: all these concepts or primary notions stand in the background of human need for radical interpretation of their own identity which is no longer a primary concept, but an interactive network of concepts. What does one mean under radical interpretation of identity? *Radical interpretation or understanding of an identity (individual or collective) is the interpretation / understanding which interprets an identity in a way that it interprets / understands itself.* One more thing, this type of interpretation or understanding needs to be distinguished from charity or generosity (Davidson's Charity Principle) on the basis of its rational structure which adds to understanding also a network of understanding consequences. To understand someone's identity means (1) to have a notion of identity in general (2) to have a notion of personal identity and (3) to have a notion of interpretation or understanding of notions of identity or another person or another nation, i.e. principles according to which they interpret / understand themselves.

A still more profound question is: what is the character of this radical interpretation in relation to representation, expression, social logic and knowledge of people. Is the existence of an institution a substantial sign that a society has a rational or logical structure, or, that it should have and aspire it? The basic idea behind this analysis is that institutional facts cannot be in collision with institutional structure if the logic of social and political ontology is to be functional.

Social Ontology and the Character
of Collective Interpretation

The peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina have several times in their history created a new social ontology, which provides the only possible basis for the development of a single or complex cultural and civilizational world of values compatible and convergent with the world of values of the European nations. The failure of one social ontology and the development of a new one does not leave the cultural and civilizational standards of a nation unchanged. Destruction, reconstruction or restoration of a social ontology always emerges from a new political ontology (new political intentions, aims, objectives). Until now Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a part of some larger entity comprised of different nations (a part of imperial ontologies), but within those entities it always had long periods of progress towards civilizational standards of coexistence, much longer than the periods of conflict produced by hyper-national ideologies. An understanding of a consocial community, its form and substance has always existed in BiH and, ultimately, it is written down in the birth certificate of this country since its conception.

Political ontology (political subjects, political objectives, political means, political organisations, political systems, political will) has the responsibility to create a new social ontology when the old ontology is destroyed or when it fails to provide firm ground for constitutional, legislative, executive, cultural, economic or education institutions of a certain community. Social ontology is not God-given (even though certain philosophers such as Aurelius Augustin and Ibn Khaldun thought that it was) and man is therefore responsible for an entire world which he creates in accordance with a convention, collective intentionality and status functions which he ascribes to forms of organisation of life which he himself creates.

Is the man-given social ontology rational or speculative, is it a result of the capacities of a man's mind and experiences, or of comparison with the experiences of other nations; or has it gone beyond the limitations of every experience and therefore collided with intellectual principles? This is not an irrelevant question. To be concrete: within the framework of the European mind and European experience, the existence of one republic, one state community of several nations, one consociation, one social ontology

which has its structure in its objects (institutions) and has its content in states of affairs and facts (institutional facts) is rationally acceptable. It is entirely speculative to even attempt to prove the impossibility of co-existence, to create totalities and absolute organisations which cancel out and terminate unidentical, different, distinct practices.

Rationality proceeds from certain prerequisites, possible forms, facts which have a certain structure which homologise all levels of a certain idea and disseminate into all forms of a certain practice; speculation proceeds from a certain absolute and develops to the level of an absolute, regardless if it takes nothing as something or something as nothing as its starting point. Rationality is subjective and creates an objective ontology; the ontology whose rational argumentation "cannot be disputed by rational means" (Scanlon, 2000, 8) without ending up in a contradiction. The speculative mind rejects exactly this rational argumentation and demands a beginning from a speculative nothing (not the nothing from which the God of monotheistic religions created the world) which evolves, denies itself and everything else and is aware of its existence because of this denial. Rational argumentation is conducted within the boundaries of what is possible; speculative begins when it crosses the boundaries of possible, when it reaches absolutely true or absolutely untrue reasons for a certain action or decision. That absolute beginning and absolute end comprise the structure of dogmatic thought.

In relation to social and political ontology this text has so far mentioned the general features of two contrasting European approaches to considering the world within the intellectual culture of the world. Speculative criticism of the European concept of rationality, from the standpoint of negative-theological, idealistic-materialistic, nihilistic-positive archaic self-consciousness which first denies itself and then everything else, recognizes no subjective social or political ontology, but only the objective ontology created from the movement of the absolute spirit through history. This absolute or world spirit has manifested itself in our region as a mythical catalyst, as an architect of all our misfortunes, as an ethno-nationalistic spirit which terminates (ethnically cleanses) all other existences (all unidentical ethnic and national identities within its region). How was it possible for speculative interests to block, prevent and disqualify a rationally acceptable structure of one social ontology?

It is visible from several cited examples of objects, facts, processes and states of affairs of the social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina that either a normal (collectively accepted) institutional structure does not exist, which results in non-existence of normal institutional facts (ones that realize deontic relations between people), or that what exists are institutions which produce deviant institutional facts. In either case, the structure and substance of the social and political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in contradiction and clearly show that the problem lies in institutions, which are neither collectively accepted nor do they produce deontic institutional facts, those that are first chosen as an expression of free will and then of political will of one community, or as a result of collective intentionality, as the content of status functions: legal order, economic security, civil rights and freedoms, religious rights and freedoms, individual prosperity, social prosperity and a high quality of life.

On the other side, the most speculative segment of European social ontology does not arise from speculative philosophy, from German Mysticism or German Classical Idealism, but from European economic empirism. Capital and the relationships it creates represent its most speculative element. European political economy has promoted itself through "sociologisation" rather than politicisation of social ontology and through "ontologisation" rather than ideologisation of social knowledge in a historical and geographical materialism designed for capital and profit. Dogmatism of Eurocentrism has always made its social ontology a rational construction within which a new scenario was always discovered for speculative capital. That scenario of capital today is an entirely speculative version of neo-liberalism which in essence means "placing profit ahead of people" (Chomsky, 2005, 35).

Within the rational social ontology of the European community capital controls all sectors. In fact, only a handful of European philosophers and sociologists have realized so far that European speculative capability rests on the interpretation and manipulation of capital, in the world of economy and law, not in the world of philosophy and pure ideas.

Institutional Facts and Status Functions

The social and historic facts concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be discussed in modal categories and "middle terms" which reduce

the risk of antithetic argumentation which leads nowhere. The facts of political ontology and the facts of social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be discussed. Certain facts need to be put into statements which can determine the truth value and for which the dependence on some other set of true conditions can be established. For example, to say that "Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state community of three constitutive peoples" is a true and objective statement which has the conditions of its truthfulness in its historical ontology and social ontology of Europe, which recognises the status function of "being a community of three or more nations". In that status function "Bosnia and Herzegovina" is a normal value, a value of a variable or an argument of that function. However, that historic fact is no longer an institutional and political fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore fails to produce institutional structures. In other words: the ruling ideology (the ruling historic and social interpretation of social ontology) does not ascribe to this fact any status function and no normative consequences derive from it.

Social ontology is a collection of status functions of one community, a collection of conventions which allow a certain society to function as a social community, and the characterisation of social ontology is determined by political ontology. I am certainly not talking here about some immaculately conceived social and political ontology of Europe, which itself is polarised and in constant need of strong corrections in humanistic and revolutionary movements, in anti-globalisation and environmental movements. I am talking about the compatibility of the social and political ontology of BiH with the European. As a consocial community, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a part of the European community of nations which recognises such societies and status functions (institutions) of such societies.

Status functions of social ontology (social institutions) have their *logical structure* in statements / declarations, laws, normative assertions, sanctions, in the integration of the collectively, generally and broadly accepted rule of social organisation, and also in the distribution of the generality and necessity of that rule down to the last individual member of the society. If one status function ascribes the status of a president of state to a certain individual, than that status function is ascribed because it is collectively accepted that he should perform his duties in that function. If a certain piece of paper or a plastic card are ascribed the status function of money, than that piece of paper and plastic card are money, an institu-

tional fact of a certain society. If one man is at the same time ascribed and denied the function of president, if a piece of paper at the same time has value and does not have value, than the logic of social ontology is contradictory, it is not even modal.

Status functions of political ontology (political institutions) acquire their shape through expressions of political will, expressions of political decisions, selection of political instruments, programmes of political objectives, facts produced by political institutions. If political will for the existence of a certain state as a republic is expressed at a referendum in that state, than that community of nations is given a certain status function of political ontology. If at the same time every possible effort is being made to depreciate that political status function on the territory of that republic, if there are parallel referendums for its independence and confederation with a neighbouring state, if people vote at elections, both in that state and in a neighbouring state, than the logic of that political ontology is paradoxal and speaks volumes about the mentality of that people.

I wish to make a clear statement here: the political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its social ontology are in collision with what is rationally acceptable and with the historically achieved model of a developed society and politics in Europe. Prior to that, they are in an internal collision with the logical structure of a normal society, with the functioning principles of any practice as part of which man purposefully uses certain means for achieving certain objectives. In the background of the creation of these collisions (external and internal) lies dogmatism and it is always connected to the absolute concept. This means that the political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina is formulated on tautologies and contradictions, on the opposition of "absolutely true" (tautological, hyper-national) and "absolutely untrue" (contradictory, anti-national) ideological concepts, rather than on *possible forms of existence* of a normal society compatible and convergent to the communities of nations united within the European frameworks of partnership and cooperation.

Three Dogmas of Nationalism

Opposition to rational belief or the logical explanation of matters rests on dogmatic belief. Dogma is in the core of claims that deny the rational explanation of a certain occurrence, either physical or social. It

denies every other explanation which rests on the connection between causes and consequences which are rationally acceptable, while dogma itself represents a part of a whole which can be either rationally refuted or is refuted by spatiotemporal events. Dogmatic concepts are those which aspire to become an absolute, eternal, final and unchangeable explanation and they constitute a system or a network of unquestionable claims which always lean on a rigidly homogenized context within which they only function.

In the function of instituting the "rescue" or "preservation" of national identity, for which, besides nationally awakened people, nationalists are also recruited, it is never a single isolated dogma, be it a national economy, national literature or national education, that is employed. Hyper-national dogmatism cannot exist without a *network of dogmas* which are connected in all directions, along their "logical" structure and semantic intentionality. Dogmatic concepts have their structure, in the same way as non-dogmatic concepts, i.e. those which possess the ability to rearrange their forms and adapt to new content. Nationalists are not dogmatists in only one field or sector of social ontology, but always and in every field.

In a national social ontology or in a national state, an intentional content of all social and cultural possibilities is always set, national content always prefixes *deontic content*. *National appears only as additional homogenization of that content in all sectors of social ontology, as a hyper-national position or behaviour towards other national identities and that homogenization is then politically orchestrated in the exclusion and denial of others and all that is different from the national content.* What makes that hyper-national position or behaviour characteristic is that it never exists when there is only one isolated dogma, but only in a network of dogmas which establish a hyper-national belief. A certain dogma justifies itself by citing a broader dogmatic structure or a network of connected "truths" which in a certain culture are justified by specific social development of identity.

Rational self-awareness of a nation on the primary culture and primary language differs from a hyper-national position, in the basis of which lies a speculative dogmatic structure of absolute inception of rights, freedoms and social relations. In the basis of a rational self-awareness lies a rational or logical network of a set of values which a culture in its inception and expression adheres to and ascribes status functions to facts of the cul-

tural world based on those criteria. These idioms of identification and representation are formed psychogenetically and ontogenetically within an established social ontology which is reliant on language, the level of abstraction and generalisation it emanates (from logical granulation and unification) and on the triangulation of the comprehension of individuality, the world and the other within it.

The hyper-national position or attitude, or *nationalism*, is unable to provide a basis for a radical interpretation of the other national identity because it is unable to reflect the other identity without resorting to the political primacy of its identity, the primacy of its culture, the values of only its model of living practice, customs, religious facts, its interpretation of history and the exaggeration of its moral system and system of values. At the same time, members of a certain national community can have a partial interpretation of another national community, for example an economic interpretation, formed on the basis of economic standards and the quality of life, which, if they are higher from those of the community interpreting then become acceptable for the majority of that national community, regardless of the differences in culture, language, religion and mentality and this then translates into economic migration and, in modern times, the rapid development of immigrant societies. Later, these differences begin to take centre stage.

The First Dogma of Nationalism:
National Isolation Strengthens National Identity

Ontology of a national identity has its reflection in national institutions: political institutions, cultural institutions, social institutions, education institutions, economic institutions, which serve for the establishment, protection and preservation of national values. National institutions serve for the establishment, protection and development of national facts (historic, geographic, military, civilian, linguistic, ethnic, anthropological, psychological, moral, cultural) which define a national identity as a form of behaviour and a collection of interactive reactions to the natural environment and the international environment. *National identity is a spatiotemporal and a geographical and historical self-awareness of a certain nation which collectively expresses its will for a specific social, political and cultural ontology with which it can identify and the semantics of which it*

adopts as its representation, seeking that it be accepted and interpreted by other collectives in the same way as members of a certain nation interpret it for themselves.

This self-awareness on primary culture and primary language, on primary historical and geographical background permeates all national facts in all sectors of social ontology: in national literature, in national philosophy, in national spiritual and social production, national geography and national education, in the national defence system. These are the facts, objects and states of affairs of a national ontology which is built on social ontology. This self-awareness, its semantics, logic and ontology are revealed in the content and structure of institutions of a society. A state-orientated national community territorializes the boundaries of the validity of its identification and representation within the state borders and they become objects of a state ontology.

However, political ontology created by a hyper-national approach, which at times of crisis in the development of a nation turns into *brutal nationalism,* tasks itself with conserving / isolating a national ontology through national institutions in order to protect the national identity as a national interest, be it by glorifying or monumentalising the background of its nation, or by minimising interaction and association of members of its nation with other nations for different reasons (religious differences, differences in the political system, racial differences, social differences, cultural and other differences), cannot achieve its objective: ideas cannot be stopped at the borders of entities or at the borders of national states. Human society is homogenized in two ways: through practices that are transferred and through ideas that are shared, through universal principles that are transferred and through deontic values that are shared.

People are connected by the living world which they shape with their own hands and opinions according to their needs and principles of their moral. This change, this transition from one practice to another cannot be stopped, nor is it possible to keep those changes only for one nation or for one geographical and historical materialism. The Pythagorean proposition is not merely a rule discovered by a Greek, it is a product of human knowledge which today belongs to humanity in Western Europe and America, in the same way as the Chaldeans from Egypt and Syria were unable to preserve it in their mythical temples from Pythagoras who learned survey from them. What is the reason for this? As Gottlob

Frege says the Pythagorean proposition is not true because it was created by some special man or special nation, but because its truthfulness is permanent and universal in the human bounds of identification and representation.

Preserving a national identity means protecting it from external influences which would weaken its rigidity or soften some of its components. This means preventing changes in mentality, language, culture, understanding and interpretation of that identity. National elites take upon themselves the protection of national interests as part of the power they exercise and as part of the political ontology they produce. The primary self-awareness of a *national elite* is economic might and based upon it power in the society. They possess economic identity and economic freedom and in this sense an elite of one nation is no different from an elite of another nation.

Because of that economic freedom and economic identity, national elites make transnational alliances, as well as economic and monetary alliances in an easier and faster manner, and also overcome cultural differences faster. Masses of people, without economic identity and economic freedom, mostly rigidly react in all components of identity. One could ironically say that the national elites strengthen cultural identity of the society members who are not in a possession of the economic power, and also weaken their economic capability and freedom, the same way they, through connecting with other national elites, strengthen their own economic power and freedom in international transactions and weaken their cultural identity (culture is for the poor!). The call for protection of national interests is made by the national elite to the people once its economic power is threatened, whether from within or from outside.

Isolation of the identity in a hyper-national self-relationship and behaviour does not necessarily lead to strengthening or even to unequivocal and undevelopmental perseverance of a national identity. Within and from the outside of such a unit, the capital-based interests are at work and the disintegration is primarily made to the capital-holding elite (national wealth, or the former state-owned companies which are in a safe possession of profit) and to the ones dependent on their work. On the other hand, identity is a phenomenon characterized as spaciotemporal, conditioned social reaction which shows itself in several different components, as professional, civic, cultural, moral, political, aesthetic and world-view.

Within an individual identity, individualism is expressed through the *network of individual components* which are, at some levels and in some situations, contradictory. Some are capable of change and adaptation, change of the living conditions, while others are less capable of that; they are rigid and are mostly the base for traditional and conservative evaluation of human practice which is constantly innovative. Rejection of changes, especially the ones in practical field of activities, like the use of contemporary information and communication technology, inactivity and incapability of functioning in the intelligent space ambience full of collections of the new technologies, new methodologies which demand interpretation and interdisciplinarity, shows that the basic cultural habits, semantic history and mentalist perspective are initially connected to the psychogenetic and social formation of an individual.

But that isolation does not strengthen, develop or promote the identity; it is the cause of its weakening and degradation. Failure to accept the modern practice decreases the capability of an individual and people isolating themselves from the usage of modern means for solving problems and for functioning in the daily life. Reduction in the use of means leads us directly to the reduction of mental competence and capability of life activities and social consciousness and contributes even more to the degradation of identity. It is known in anthropology, cognitive psychology and cognitive science that the human rational capability, both cognitive and linguistic, develops faster through social intelligence than through mere instrumental intelligence (Donald, 1993, 10).

It is not possible in national isolation to either protect national identity from acceptance of a bad practice or from negative interpretations of the national identity. Identity has always been an interactive phenomenon, even at the level of personal identity. Reduction of work of the people to the primitive way of production, to the traditional expression of life's interests and to rigid implementation of the religious practice, without adjustments to the space, time and knowledge achieved, archives the world which is, by its functional nature, connective, and which, naturally, asks to be formalized in the status functions of a society. A smart, skilful and educated man who has isolated himself from others does not exist, the same way that a smart and productive people, isolated from other peoples, does not exist. Human being is a being which, apart from consciousness possesses self-consciousness. A nation is also a being which shows self-

consciousness through its language and interprets itself as a nation in its political ontology.

The biggest advocates of hyper-national behaviour and the closest of the collectives have the need of a radical interpretation of their individuality, their identity and cultural ground of their collective intentions, which realize their objectification within a social and political ontology. *Radical interpretation of the national identity demands that one's individual or national identity is interpreted and understood the way it interprets and understands itself.* Isolation of a people from others in an area (whether linguistic, cultural, religious, political, educational) can never lead to a radical interpretation or radical understanding of that people, its cultural and political will, its physical and psychological reactions, its social and political ontology; for isolation annuls the conditions which make possible for the other people to interpret it the way it interprets itself.

Absence of the radical interpretation of the identity of a people, culture or civilization leads to conflict predispositions, to prejudice which are always a subject of manipulation. A man is never what he thinks himself to be; nor is a nation or its culture what it perceives itself to be. Without comparative consciousness which is formed in the comparative practice of exchange of cultural ontology and cultural capital, it is not possible to set the standards of evaluation, the standards of development of a nation in the future; it is not possible to develop the immunity of identity and capability of adaptation to the future changes within an isolated environment and in the world.

Reduction of cultural and personal identity to a single component, for example, religious, out of which the entire essence of a people is interpreted, both in theory and in practice, will first lead to isolation in all other components and the people's identity, without leaving any possibility of an individual to show his priorities in relation to the quality of life.

The Second Dogma of Nationalism:
Multicultural and Multinational Communities Are not Possible

The concept of a multicultural society followed after the concepts of *assimilation*, *integration* and *pluralism*, which were created and introduced as political facts of political ontology in multiethnic countries, formed after the great immigration processes, completed by mid-twentieth century

in Europe, failed to successfully subserve ethnic differences in a society to the members of one national identity. Assimilation, in the form of amalgamization, failed, the same way as integration, to eliminate the need of different ethnicities to preserve their culture and language in the territory of a country which accepted those peoples and within which the ethnical niches were made. Experience from the United States and Canada, which are pots for fusion of cultures and ethnic particularities, as well as the growing nationalist movement in the European countries (Kivisto, 2002), have shown that it is necessary to continue looking for a model of the society which will not result in the balkanization of the area (ethnic cleansing and genocide).

The concrete social state of *multiculutrality* was necessarily joined by the terms of *multiculturalism* and *interculturalism*. As the concept of social ontology or the *de facto* state of affairs, the concept of "multiculturality" should be differed from "multiculturalism", which is the concept of political ontology, that is, a normative demand of a society towards ethnicities and individuals, meaning to respect the right of other ethnicities to use their culture and language. Different theories observe multicultural societies differently (Kivisto, 2002, 27 – 41), but inevitability of different ways of social interweaving and blending of peoples in the process of accelerated and mass creation of "immigrant societies" as a "model of coexistence and possible tolerance" (Walzer, 1997, 30) in the world and in Europe is of the essence.

It should be stressed that, in today's world, owners of the international companies and multinational corporations, who act via the bureaucratic centres of their associations, are the bearers of the idea of transnational identity and, at the same time, advocates of theories on possibilities of existence of multinational, multicultural, multiconfessional states. Owners of the capital are, as a matter of fact, now internationally connected national elites, representatives of the "weak theory of identity" (transnational identity), of the social theory based on the knowledge and of the theory of creation of the intelligent space ambience (Ibrulj, 2005, 17 – 47). Of course, they will support such an option as long as it brings them profit and as long as it reflects their economic power. No philosophy and no sociology may guarantee that they will always want it. On the contrary.

Neo-liberalism paves way to the *international capital*, which tears down the borders in Europe, changes the state constitutions and creates

conditions for an undisrupted travel around the world in the form of merchandise, money and information, and for return in the form of profit. It is, actually, that speculative substance of the society of Western Europe, which takes the rational form of political and social ontology. The most prominent philosophers and sociologists of today have characterized the cooperation between neo-liberalism, pragmatism and international capital as the "new imperialism" (Noam Chomsky, 2003; David Harvey, 2005).

That is one view of multinational and multicultural society. Owners of capital, economic and political power have always been able to find an ideology to increase their capital and make the rich richer and the poor poorer. The way to put an end to that is not rejection or negation of the possibility of survival of multinational, multicultural and multiconfessional communities, although there is a danger for those ideas to be abandoned, just like factories from which the capitalists have withdrawn production and moved it to the other part of the world, once they found cheaper labour. Multinational communities are possible primarily as social communities of citizens and then as consociations of constitutive peoples.

Multinational and multicultural society is possible as consocation of partner nations who share a territory and who participate in the spiritual world which is a result of their radical interpretation of political, cultural, economic, social, physical, psychological and professional identity. Passing a constitution and laws of a country which has a rational consciousness on the primary culture and consciousness that there is the other man, the other people which also has the right to an identity and consciousness on the primary culture and language is simple. The functioning of such a society is simple, until the political elites start creating the hyper-national political ontology which leads towards nationalism. Economic liberties of the people, political and human rights, decrease the power of national elites and neutralize their rhetoric about the threatened peoples and their call to the people for protection of the national rights which are sent at the time when their economic power is threatened.

Membership in transnational organizations may ensure such practice, as well as implementation of standards for separation of one practice. According to Peter Kivisto, "Existence of the European Community has strengthened the idea of a multicultural citizenship. The issue is not that we have stepped forward into the post-national world in which transnational organizations, such as the EU, corrupt the nations' prerogatives. The

issue is that the European Community, in the context of Western Europe, had to play a role in the adjustment of a variety of national practices and policies for the sake of the interest of a coherent position of the EU" (Kivisto, 2002, 185).

Radical interpretation of an identity in multinational and multicultural societies has its foundations and reasons, for it develops a different form of tolerance from the indifferent relation of bureaucratic structures towards some non-canonical practices and enables their reoccurrence until a moment in which they could be codified. The shape of tolerance which is necessary in the radical interpretation of identity of the other, other individual or other people, liberates the space and possibility for selection of the identity preferences. In what way? In the way that the radical tolerance, not an indifferent tolerance, tolerates itself what it tolerates to others; that is, it is aware that consequences of tolerance also mean change of the position or status in a society or position in a community.

Identity is a dynamic spaciotemporal phenomenon, a network or collection of reactions interconnected and mutually conditioned. It is possible that someone supporting an X football club is not an avid supporter of the hyper-national behaviour characteristic of a supporter of a Y football club, because two persons of different nationalities play at the X football club, while the Y club is one-national. It is possible for the X person to marry a Y person because he/she possesses a consistent moral behaviour and attitudes, regardless of the ethnic or national affiliation, not preferred by that particular community. It is possible that the X person is religious and studies logic and philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, for he/she is of the opinion that it is necessary to be able to rationally argument one's attitudes. Rigidity or softness of this network of identity components or collection of identity reactions, which is positioned differently in every individual, is always conditioned by psychological and social preferences of an individual, and is not always and in every situation subjected to the criteria of hyper-national behaviour and national affiliation.

Individuality of human rights and liberties is the principle which ensures the rational "initial equilibrium" which the society owes to all members of the social agreement (Scanlon, 2000). Identification with a national community and expression of affiliation to culture and symbols of that community is an individual human right. However, it is also an

individual human right not to identify with one's national community, or to identify with some other national community, or not to consider national identification and representation to be the decisive element of human relations. Voting for the most capable candidate at elections, regardless of his/her nationality, is an individual human right. Otherwise, the once-octroyed concept of an isolated national identity, which determines the "dynamics" of every individual in isolation, will fail to enable the rights, liberties or their dynamics.

This is where the issue of deductive or inductive politics opens time and again: is it necessary to form a legal state based on individual human rights and liberties or rather on collective rights and liberties? Can individual human rights be deduced without trouble from the collective rights and liberties or is it necessary to build all that is collective from that which is individual? If one considers private property and individual happiness of people to be at the very foundations of progress towards any kind of collective ownership and collective well-being, then the question is if it is necessary to support the inductive political logic. The most important issue is existence of both kinds of rights and the possibility of consuming those rights. "Existence of both kinds of rights" here means practicing the rights on the daily basis, not their mere existence in philosophical and social theories which, as appears, represent an obligation to no one.

Multinational and multicultural societies offer more opportunities to an individual to freely form his identity, through choices, without the pressures of collective, especially national criteria. A multinational society such as the one existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the environment it exists and functions, did not necessarily have to go the way it had gone through from 1992 to 1995. No one has profited from going that way, not in Bosnia and Herzegovina and not in the region. Results of that "voyage", to which the peoples were pushed by force of brutal nationalism, and which were displayed in the ethnic cleansing and genocide, are proof that, in comparison to the coexistence and tolerance of differences that are not as huge, the one-national madness has no value and cannot lead to positive facts, neither in political, nor in social, nor in historical and cultural ontology.

The Third Dogma of Nationalism:
Transnational Society Annuls National Identities

To understand a national social ontology means to understand the global social ontology; to understand the global social ontology means to master the technique of constitution of social objects, facts, processes and situation of things which constitute the social institutions. The technique of constitution of a society is actually always made up of procedures of passing and implementation of laws which protect the human identity in all the sectors of society, not only and primarily national identity. To understand a national economy or a national literature means to understand the global economy or world literature; to understand the global economy and world literature means to master a technique of managing the capital or a technique of managing the language or literature forms.

There is nothing strange about that: *the concept of identity is exclusively holistic, interactive, interpretative, communicational, spaciotemporal phenomenon which has its dimensions and rules of constitution.* Are we now in a position to expand that approach and say: to understand a national institution means to understand the institution in general or the concept of institutional organization of social and political life within which some facts may appear as social and historical themes, as possibilities of functioning of a social system within wider social systems, wider social and political ontologies. Acceptance of rational cognitive principles and acquisition of rational linguistic and cognitive competences enables the narrowing of space for arguments of hyper-national attitude and hyper-national interpretation of political and social relations.

The idea of a transnational society is not new, although it has never been realized outside the works of some philosophers. Today, it has become the leading social idea which comes not only form the philosophy of freedom, but also from the metaphysics of capital, from political economy related to the fluctuation of capital, merchandise and people in the world; from the neo-liberal philosophy of market and globalization processes. It has again been proven that the most influential philosophical ideas of the West are actually economic ideas and concepts: it is not about the movement of spirit and function of notion; it is about the speculative phenomenology of the capital which necessarily keeps finding itself a new form. It is specifically the case that the European documents and

the European science-related research projects (creating the excellence networks, project integrations) insist upon the identity research in globalization processes, that is, upon the research of possibilities of formation of a transnational identity.

In the process, information and communication technology help eliminate certain borders in Europe: language, culture and religious differences. Those borders remained after the unification of the 25 European countries with a single parliament and constitution. How is it possible for technology to eliminate those borders? Behind information and communication technology, there is another kind of language, which is different than the one which built the national society institutions: that is the artificial language, the language of expert systems, the language of computers, the language of a new world process in Europe: it is the language of assembling, processing and manipulating information. Information is now the raw material. Anyone attempting to participate in a profitable work process needs to learn to assemble, store, process and use a piece of information. Muscles and the natural languages of industrial halls are of no use; it is IT education and artificial languages that the programs are developed on.

Globalization has made the international society desirable not only for the owners of capital, but also for the ordinary people who have a possibility to participate in a post-modern compression of space and time which has brought the worlds, cultures, nations, languages and civilizations closer together. The fact that those processes have mobilized and made the identity reactions of the modern society more dynamic, dependable and interactive is undisputable. *Information and communication technology, when used globally, enables the society engineering; creation of a knowledge-based society, creation of procedures and institutional algorhytms for solving problems, which are available only to the users of the new technologies.* New institutions and a new social ontology, in which only the technically/functionally literate members of the society, regardless of their national affiliation, cultural, religious or language differences, may participate, are formed from the artificial languages and logical syntax. An intelligent space ambience is created, encompassing all the human surrounding; inhabiting all the spaces and components of the human identity.

Man changes both as a practical and theoretical being. He changes through his ideas and actions which are brought to life with new ideas. New ideas and new actions are formed from a new approach to solving problems and from a new way of using the rational competence in postulating the relations of cause and effect. That development cannot be stopped, for it comes from an identity of a human being as a member of a species, as a being producing his own species. National identity surfaces in that relationship, because everybody partakes in it with certain capacity. Development of the human identity, as a species, defines also the development of national identity. Peoples who have, by the wholeness of their mentality, changed the way of production, improved the quality of life, ensured the economic power of the society, stopped the conflicts in their territory, found and produced medicine for diseases, are today called the developed world, a developed and rich society. Peoples who have wasted their substance to the metaphysical, mythological, religious and historic interpretations of the physical and intellectual world and of the human activities, failed to produce the means for actions in the world and they are today called the underdeveloped peoples and cultures.

This is, of course, only a simplified description of the "possibilities of the nation and society", behind which numerous other factors exist, such as the unbalanced distribution of wealth in the world. However, both the cultural and national identity of a people also means the extent of freedom that people has been able to realize in the past and present, as well as the society that people used to live in and the leaders it has chosen. National identity is not God-given. There is a price for its stagnation and a price for its development. Numerous cultures, numerous peoples, numerous languages have disappeared in the history and others have been formed. Most of them did not disappear in the processes of assimilation, amalgamization, integration, pluralization, interculturalization, hybridization or creolization, but in brutal aggressions, conquests, genocide and ethnic cleansing of territories.

Transnational society has become the "casted" open net of the world, which may be a maze for some ethnic and national identities in which they can disappear from the stage forever, or in which they can become participants and partners in the process of creation of a better common practice which makes life easier and more attractive. The peoples who failed to create a better society within their state borders are incapable

of creating a better transnational society, the same way the intolerant national societies are not able to create a tolerant international society.

The Logic of Consociation

The present social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina *does not have* the normal status functions characterized by logical, functional and *rationally acceptable structure* that is comparable to the structure of status functions in the organized and developed European societies. That is the reason why its objects, facts, situation of things and processes are constantly in contradiction with the normal status functions of the open and contemporary society. The present political ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not possess a normal intentional and collective agenda (the deontic values); it does not possess the normal intentional objects and intentional activities because it produces the tautologically separate systems, or isolated consciousness of the separate corpus, which do not cooperate as a whole and which place the ethno national dogmatism ahead of the life agenda (individual and collective freedoms, individual and collective economic well-being, individual and collective human rights, etc.).

The Politics of a Possible Consociation

In the history of development of nations, in the process of their positioning, identification and models of representation of their self-consciousness, two main forms of establishment of relations within a political geography have been defined. Primarily, the *adaptive national extension* (coexistence, entanglement, joint institutions) of two or three national communities in an area, whose social interests have become entwined to an extent that they necessarily produce a consocial political ontology. On the other hand, a divergent political ontology of the political geography is possible, as we have seen for ourselves; the *aggressive national extension* (seizure of territories, wars, aggressions, annexation, ethnic cleansing, genocide) of different national communities in an area, trying to isolate one from another because of the historic heritage or only because of the striving to become a part of another state community they consider to be their mother country.

Michael Walzer, in the book *On Toleration* talks about the *five social models of coexistence* and, in the chapter entitled "Consociations", he gives the examples of Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon and Cyprus, as well as of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the recent history (Walzer, 1997:22). I will shortly present the possibilities of consociation, according to Walzer:

1. consociation is a heroic program
2. consocial societies are without bueareucratical distance
3. different national groups tolerate each other in consociation
4. consociation is a simple, non-mediated competition of two or three communities
5. consociation enables free negotiation between the political parties
6. consociation enables free agreement on constitutional arrangement
7. consociation enables free formation of institutions
8. consociation enables free conclusion of political agreements for the purpose of protection of divergent interests.

Examples of consociation named by Walzer do not go in favour of such a model of organization of the state community. Belgium and Switzerland are examples of a successful consociation, Lebanon, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from a society based on any kind of productive and development-oriented principle. Political ontology of a society, even consocial, is a result of the realistic relations of all the subjects of a society at a certain point in time and in a certain space, towards the social ontology of that society, that is, towards the existence of social objects, social processes and social facts. It is, at the same time, the ontology of values or ontology of deciding in favour or against, and the most preferred ontology of a poli-national community. Successful consociation is possible only as a consociation of citizens and peoples in a space and time.

It is possible to add the *difference in the type of consociation* to the test conducted by Michael Walzer: the *completed consociations* or organized consocial societies, like Switzerland and Belgium, stand opposite the *uncompleted consociations* or unorganized consocial societies, like Lebanon, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. One may say that, in the first type, social ontology has produced the political ontology, that is, the social interest of national communities in an area is realized as political will and political interest. In the second case, the divergent political ontology had preceded the destruction of a kind of the social ontology, and has still not offered a satisfactory construction of a rationally acceptable social ontology.

What kind of intentional and collective agenda is necessary to exist in political ontology in order to develop a normal social ontology with the status functions that have their logical and purposeful structure? Here I will mention the three key prerequisites a consociation needs to fulfil in order to be able to form economic, military, monetary, territorial and mentality associations. In that sense, one should keep in mind that the economic stability of all the peoples entering a consociation is vital for a completed consociation, which means a standard of economic performances of the citizens, a standard of political freedoms and human rights. Those are the criteria or the standards that potential members of narrow or broad consocial communities need to have achieved. But, in order to be able to realize the concrete demands of any "road map", it is necessary to fulfil certain conditions in the sense of mentality of peoples and individuals. Here, I will mention only three conditions that are immediately connected with the notion of identity.

The First Condition for a Consocial Community:
The Comparative Experience of Consciousness

It is possible to characterize identity, within the framework of social and political ontology, as an interactive collection of reactions (physical, psychological, linguistic, economic, moral, ethical, logical, social, mental, professional, working, etc.), individual or collective, which is formed in communication, in interpretation of oneself and the other, in exchange of representation and acceptance or refusal of value identification (Ibrulj, 2005, 17 – 47). How is it possible to, in that context, characterize transnational identity? Transnational identity is a network or collection of reactions, which emerges from comparative intentionality and comparative collective consciousness. What is it that makes collective intentionality of an isolated national reaction, which stands in the basis of development of a national social ontology or national institutions, different from comparative collective intentionality and comparative collective consciousness which determines the status functions of an intentional society?

Comparative intentionality is at the very basis of human practice, practice of the being who knows it is not alone in the world and who draws, from the knowledge on existence of the other and different in the world, a possibility of existence of practices and values that are identical to or

different from one's own, which can be better or worse, which can be rejected or accepted, and which can trigger a reflection on one's own practice. *Comparative reflection* is the main part of institutional development of a society, for it is this constant reflexiveness in a reflexive context that is an important characteristic of modernity lived by a being. "That is the context of complete reflexivity which is the third major influence on the dynamism of modern institutions. Reflexivity of modernity means sensitivity of all the aspects of social activity and material relations towards nature for a continual revision in the light of modern information and knowledge. Such information or knowledge is no coincidence for the modern institutions, but rather constitutive – it is a complex phenomenon, for many possibilities of reflection on reflexivity exist in the modern social conditions (Giddens, 2004, 20).

The following question needs to be asked in this context: What conditions has Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfilled to join an association of peoples such is the Europe? In other words, Why does Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the family of the European peoples? The second important question follows immediately: Why is Bosnia and Herzegovina not able to enter any kind of integration with the developed countries of West Europe? One should not spend many words on proving the claim that it would be better and more useful for the peoples of Bosnia in Herzegovina, who have always lived in a community, and who can live in a consociation, to cease the speculative improvement of "the nothing", to reject the hyper-national behaviour, nihilism and sacrifice of an ordinary human life, in favour of living practices based on intellectual and cultural capital, values of which can be rationally explained, argumented and accepted by a healthy human mind and used for creation of a better and more just society.

One simple answer to the first question is possible to find in characterization of the mentality of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who want to live a civilized life (I do not refer here to political or religious elites who have been "trained" somewhere outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, either in the East or in the West): the general image of the world in the minds of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is convergent; cultural values which have dominated in this area were formed interculturally; customs do not differ drastically and can be radically interpreted; confessional differences have been rationally accepted and can be accommodated

with radical tolerance; languages of the peoples are compatible; grammar of those languages is the same regardless of the different terms used; and, finally, logical structure determining an identity and which is at the core of language structures is the same. That means that the mentality differences are bridgeable.

Furthermore: that logical structure is rationalistic, developed from top to bottom and laterally, the way the hierarchy of beliefs, opinions and actions is connected, via the principle of cause and effect. All that says that the ontogenetic and psychogenetic characteristics of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are generally compatible with the mental and more narrowly psychological structures of the European peoples, regardless of the fact that some elites want to connect the peoples with some closer or more distant cultures and mentalities. *A culture that is not lived and a language that is not thought in cannot serve as a basis for a rationally accepted identification, or as a basis for either personal or national identity.* Comparative consciousness is formed naturally inside a spaciotemporal compression and that is why the phenomenon of cultural syncretism is formed within a historical and geographical materialism, not via connection with the remote paradoxical or even mystic and speculative practices.

Transnational comparative intention is the product of *global tangibility of human practices* within a "postmodern spaciotemporal compression" (Harvey, 1998) and their interactive reflection. That global tangibility/accessibility of human practices or the interactivity of the living practices and their mutual reflection in a modern society is the glue which holds the international communities together.

The Second Condition for a Consocial Community: A Society Lead by Tolerance

It is exactly in the European social ontology that the need has arisen and a demand was formulated for an indifferent relationship of the authorities ranging from contrasting religious standards in one area, to certain differences in religious practice, the senseless opposition of which led to bloody and mass conflicts. The idea that the ruling structure adopts an *indifferent relationship* towards the differentiated religious practices supposed to result in relaxation for the society of Western Europe, whose invisible ontology of freedom in the area of beliefs drifted to Catholic and

Protestant. Some theologians of the time (Calvin, Luther) and philosophers (John Locke) advocated an indifferent and neutral relationship of authorities towards certain religious issues. This indifference remained to this day a model of tolerance (as behaviour), although some theoretical attempts were made to expand the notion of tolerance (as a theoretical relationship) to the topics of justice.

But, is tolerance only a *neutral attitude* or an indifferent relationship; or do we need to talk about prerequisites and consequences of tolerance? Is a tolerant state possible without tolerant individuals? Is it possible to limit the tolerance to actions of individuals in a given social situation? Can one tolerate in others what one refuses to tolerate in himself? Prerequisites of tolerance are intrinsic and are integrated into the social consciousness of a human being as a member of the human kind. The man's social being would not be possible without tolerance of the other and the different within the same species.

Radical interpretation of the identity is, as a matter of fact, the non-indifferent form of tolerance, that is, radical tolerance is the way of actions and opinions in which the man reflects the consequences of his own actions and opinions in the relationship towards the other and the consequences of actions of the other towards himself. Tolerance is always connected to the issue of identity, for identity is always expressed as the conduct of value or attitude or reaction towards one's own activities or activities of the other, whether practical or theoretical.

One should now ask: is distinctiveness, authenticity, self-consciousness on primacy of one's own culture and language lost in the meeting with the other? What are really the consequences of tolerance of the other and of the different? The consequences of reflection exist, as well as consideration of the status functions and intentional agenda, of the world that is one's own and individual to national and international. Tolerance without consideration and indifferent comparison which does not expand the human knowledge may result in negative consequences. Reflexive tolerance does not leave the man indifferent, for it includes both the subject and the object of tolerance in the same circle; for it contributes the adaptation of the people to their own and to the reactions of others.

Identity is not lost in that way, but rather, it is perfected, supplemented, rearranged and adapted to the new conditions of appearance. Those conditions cannot be removed by avoidance of civilized standards, for the

phenomena through which they are brought into light imbue our conscious and involuntary reaction to the environment. The man has evolved from Homo Habilis to Homo Erectus, from Homo Erectus to Homo Sapiens, and all the way to Homo Informaticus. Speaking on the basis of the human prehistory and, on the basis of proofs of neurobiology, all the stages of the human identity the man has gone through until this very day are present in the human brain, but, more importantly, nobody today feels nostalgic about the stone, bow and arrow. The development of human society and transformation it brings, means development of the human identity, development and change of the human reactions, both individual and collective, in favour of the new values that are formed in a context and intercontextually, in a culture and interculturally.

The Third Condition for a Consociate Community: A Society Based on Freedoms

The leading idea of the contemporary Europe is the *idea of the knowledge-based society.* The result of that idea should be a new intelligent space ambience and a new society based on the knowledge that has, at its basis, neoliberalism, globalization and globally applied information and communication technology. That should lead towards the creation of an expert society, capable of being compared to the American society. In regard to those ideas, it is perhaps necessary to *differently centre the quality of human life,* which is never according to the rules prescribed by engineers of social ontology. Behind the procedures, both expert and theological, there is a semantic history and perspectivism of a mental background which is developed in accordance to the qualitative patterns. One of the most powerful archetypal patterns of individual and collective consciousness is freedom, and, within it, economic freedom.

There are two concepts of freedom in the European tradition: the *speculative freedom,* freedom of opinion, within a broader concept of the phenomenology of spirit which primarily determines itself and then the limits of its scope. Everything that is beyond the reach (the entire senses-felt reality) and that cannot be brought to the face of the Global Spirit which happens only in Europe and in the West (the Eurocentrism) is not worth the recognition. That speculative, in essence, a theological concept of freedom stands opposite the *rational practical freedom* within a wider

concept of conflict of differences, social, class and competitive/individual differences, which realize the area of realistic freedom within economic freedom, private ownership and individual well-being. It is on these, "invisible" ontologies that the modern European societies are based.

Without the spectrum of freedoms which provide an individual with substantial power or capability, it is not possible to imagine the developmental concept of the society and it is not possible to construct the bottom-up ideology as "the sutrcture of the society structure"(Ibrulj, 2005), which endangers the human rights and political freedoms in the smallest extent possible. Without the spectrum of economic freedoms it is not possible to think of a potential or rational initial equilibrium for every individual in a society. Without the "capability approach" in economy (represented by Amartya Sen) the people's autonomy in the decision-making processes related to daily issues or issues that concern the selection of social or political ontology is not possible. Economic freedoms and economic equality enable self-reliance, which is a part of the concept of individual and collective intention and individual and collective acceptance.

Amartya Sen, an esteemed professor of economy, a lecturer in Great Britain, India and America; Nobel Prize Laureate for Economy in 1998, comments in his book *Development of Freedom* on economic transactions in his surroundings, and gives an example from his childhood: "One afternoon, I was playing – I must have been ten or so – in the garden of our family house in the town of Dhaka, now the capital of Bangladesh, when a man ran through the door painfully screaming and bleeding extensively; he was stabbed in the back. Those were the days of riots (in which Hindu and Muslims killed each other), which had preceded independence and separation of India and Pakistan. The stabbed man, by the name of Kader Mia, was a Muslim, a labourer, who used to come to a house in our neighbourhood because of business – and for a miserable wage. He had been stabbed in the street by one of the city assassins within our wide Hindu area. As I was giving the man some water, crying for the adults' help, and later, when my father transferred him to the hospital, Kader Mia said that his wife had told him not to enter the enemy area in such rough times. But, Kader Mia had to leave in search of work and money, for his family had nothing to eat. The toll for his economic freedom was death, because that was what happened later in the hospital… The

lack of economic freedom can give birth to a lack of social freedom, in the same way as the lack of social and political freedom can give rise to a lack of economic freedom (Sen, 2001, 8)."

Understanding the social development through institutions is not really possible without understanding the interactive tangle of individual and collective freedoms, that is, political freedoms and human rights which constitute the human freedom. Those freedoms determine the quality of life and mental perspective of a society. In the "freedom-centred development" approach, Amartya Sen is advocating, freedoms are taken as the constitutional and instrumental principles of development of the human society, that is, as goals and means. In the process, it is necessary – as Amartya Sen states – to clearly define instrumental perspective of the human freedom, which consists of (1) political freedoms, (2) economic benefits, (3) social opportunities/chances, (4) clear guarantees and (5) safety of protection. In the same way, a coherent and rational development of a society is not possible without social consciousness, without solidarity and without universal ethics of responsibility. Without a philosophy of freedom and without its categories, economic freedom is impossible to realize; it is also not possible to claim or use freedom, whether within a national state or for the construction of a consocial community of citizens and peoples.

Conclusion

Whether or not Bosnia and Herzegovina meets the historical prerequisites for membership in the European union of peoples should no longer be an issue. Its social and historical ontology has a p o s i b i l l i t y of the ststus functions which such a community recognizes, accepts and according to which it functions. Political ontology is the issue, that is, the issue is the political construction of the state ontology. What do the political forces of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina plan to do with the country? What are the means at their disposal? What are the political programs of the ruling political parties? How powerful is the opposition? Which concept is supported by members of the European Community? What are their final intentions?

The *political ontology of hyper-national behaviour* and open nationalism is at the scene today; the same nationalism which had brought

about the aggressive events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the national mimicry in the present time. National parties hold the power and are unable to create a consociate society. Instead, they organize national territories/reservates whose representatives cooperate in the process of destruction of the idea of multicultural and multinational societies, of tolerance and competitive consciousness. Without rearranging the political ontology, it will not be possible to rearrange the social ontology. Neither is possible without the reconstruction of the existing logical structure of the society and without centring the practice onto freedom and quality of life.

Perhaps it is necessary to ask: what is the periphery and what is the centre of political ontology of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina? What is necessary and what is accidental in that social structure or in the structure of the very core of our existence here and now? What can the political ontology, as a social practice of making decisions, solving problems, creating positive intentional agenda, enabling the function of the daily life of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, do? It can do everything. It can do nothing. It can pretend to be deaf and blind to the existence of logic and the axiom of social life. It can also find a functional, simple algorhythm for passing decisions on what the education should be like, what the human rights should be like, what the economy should be like. Political ontologists of a social ontology may be deaf or blind, educated or uneducated, trained in democracy or in despotism, progressive or ruthless and intentionally negative.

It is possible that the *hyper-national elites* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which create social and political ontology, "know all this but do not want to understand". It is possible that they "know everything but they are unable to change the situation right now". It is possible that they are waiting for "a right opportunity" or for the "right possibilities" for something else. What is the opportunity? Should we wait for it? Or maybe there is no opportunity, for they simply hate the peoples living with them. They have, as they have stated themselves, led the war because of that hatred, they killed and got killed because of it. They need not be called for logic and rationality. *A pointer on their nationalistic compass always shows them their historic and social prerequisites.* Their semantic history and mental perspective are set and oriented differently and they developed differently. That is why their reactions are rigidly expressed identity components.

Are the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina capable (economically, socially, psychologically, communicationally, culturally, politically) of realizing an acceptable consociation, a community which is not without risks and in which paper roses do not grow; in which the ministers do not wear neither black nor pink glasses, in which the family and mafia clans, nepotism, unbearable tolerance of indifference, intolerance, lack of freedom, depravation, religious exclusiveness and the lack of economic power do not rule? It is necessary to stop dreaming about coexistence as the immediate cause one should not invest in, as the cause not worth knowledge or education, as the cause in which it is possible to isolate oneself and preserve one's own identity in a collective or individual isolation.

Social ontology of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be equivalent of a *wider social ontology* and a *wider historical ontology,* namely, the ontology of the European community and the history of the European peoples. That is because Bosnia and Herzegovina has a possibility of satisfying the status functions which could be equivalent to the status functions of the European countries. As a civil state community of peoples, Bosnia and Herzegovina has references in the European political ontology. As a religious or militaristic or rigidly-ideological state community of peoples it has no references. There is no religious or militaristic or rigidly-ideological form accepted in Europe as a state structure, as a social ontology providing all the citizens with the *equilibrium of initial freedoms and chances* which is something every society owes to an individual. As a community of equal peoples and free citizens, its political ontology could be equivalent to the European political ontology.

It was necessary to make a distinction between (1) self-conscious national attitude, (2) hyper-national attitude or behaviour which rests upon a network of dogmas and (3) an openly nationalistic behaviour which is brutally realized through aggressive politics of destruction of the other and the different. What modern society imposes by its existence is a way out from a closed, isolated and inner experience of the people and individuals and an immediate entrance to reflection, determination and comparison with the experiences of other peoples and individuals. There is a wider ontology and knowledge than is the ontology and knowledge of the first person or primary culture or national identity. It is only through opening towards the other and the different that a logical answer to the following question is possible: Can one rationally form an idea of (4)

a transnational attitude or behaviour and what are the disadvantages and the advantages of such an idea?

Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to conduct a serious rational reconstruction of its social and political ontology, and not only because it needs to enter the European Union. That needs to be done because of the mental health of the peoples and the quality of life of the peoples and citizens in this area. It is certain that such a reconstruction cannot be planned or realized by the people who do not accept the laws of thinking, the laws of human organization, the standards of modern life, the good and evil of the postmodern society, the standards of the information and communication technology, the standards of religious tolerance, the standards of economic freedoms, the standards of political rights, the standards of quality of human life. The speculative interests of capital owners, be they national or transnational, can only be caught into a rational network of convictions and a rational network of opinions based upon it. Without such an understanding, it is not possible to start a new practice which would eliminate the contradictions from the daily lives of people. Those contradictions arise every day: to possess only on paper not in reality, to exist only on paper not in reality.

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